

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.				
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE 2 Jun 00		3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's Thesis 6 Aug 99--2 Jun 00
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE <i>Requirements for</i> Intelligence Operations in Support of Operations Other Than War			5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) MAJ Bruce H. Guggenberger, USA				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD 1 Reynolds Ave. Ft. Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/ MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)			10. SPONSORING/MONITORING	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES			20001115 058	
12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE A	
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words) This study examines the intelligence requirements and collection methods recommended in support of operations other than war (OOTW). An examination of four case study examples (Operation Just Cause, Operation Restore Hope, Operation Uphold Democracy, and Operation Joint Endeavor) determines the intelligence requirements necessary for OOTW, and collection methods developed over the course of these operations that help satisfy these requirements. The intelligence requirements for these operations were compared to what is currently contained in Army military intelligence doctrine. By comparing these requirements against doctrine the researcher developed gaps that were not contained in doctrine, but are necessary for intelligence professionals to examine when preparing for missions under the OOTW umbrella. The doctrine proved to be partially correct when preparing for OOTW. The study finds three major intelligence requirements that must be added to doctrine to fully prepare units for OOTW operations. The recommendations are by no means an all-exclusive list, every operation involving US forces will be different from the previous operation. What the author does is recommend a baseline for intelligence requirements and collection methods, which is contained in chapter 5 of the study.				
14. SUBJECT TERMS Operations other than war, Operation Joint Endeavor, Operation Just Cause, Operation Restore Hope, Operation Uphold Democracy, Intelligence Requirements, Stability and Support Operations. Low Intensity Conflict. Bosnia. Haiti. Somalia. Panama			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 70	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT UNCLASSIFIED			16. PRICE CODE	
18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED			19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED	
			20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UL	

**INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS FOR
OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR**

**A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree**

**MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies**

by

**BRUCE H. GUGGENBERGER, MAJ, USA
B.S., St. Cloud State University, St. Cloud, MN, 1987**

**Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
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
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
Name of Candidate: MAJ Bruce H. Guggenberger

Thesis Title: Intelligence Requirements for Operations Other Than War


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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR by MAJ Bruce H. Guggenberger, USA, 64 pages.

This study examines the intelligence requirements and collection methods recommended in support of operations other than war (OOTW). An examination of four case study examples (Operation Just Cause, Operation Restore Hope, Operation Uphold Democracy, and Operation Joint Endeavor) determines the intelligence requirements necessary for OOTW, and collection methods developed over the course of these operations that help satisfy these requirements. The intelligence requirements for these operations were compared to what is currently contained in Army military intelligence doctrine. By comparing these requirements against doctrine the researcher developed gaps that were not contained in doctrine, but are necessary for intelligence professionals to examine when preparing for missions under the OOTW umbrella.

The doctrine proved to be partially correct when preparing for OOTW. The study finds three major intelligence requirements that must be added to doctrine to fully prepare units for OOTW operations. The recommendations are by no means an all-exclusive list, every operation involving US forces will be different from the previous operation. What the author does is recommend a baseline for intelligence requirements and collection methods, which is contained in chapter 5 of the study.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to acknowledge the efforts of my thesis committee in the completion of this thesis. My committee Colonel Steven Rotkoff, Colonel Michael Heredia, and Colonel Wayne Powell guided me through this process with insightful guidance and great patience. I thank them all for their efforts.

I would also like to thank my twelve-year-old son, who gave me the critical encouragement when completion of this thesis seemed the farthest away. Thank You Derek.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the iron curtain in the fall of 1989 resulted in great changes throughout the world. The United States emerged as the sole superpower. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the breakup of Yugoslavia, and the reemergence of many ethnic and tribal conflicts throughout the world have created an unstable environment in many regions of the world. A *National Security Strategy for a New Century* published in October 1998 states:

Smaller-scale contingency operations encompass the full range of military operations short of major theater warfare, including humanitarian assistance, peace operations, enforcing embargoes and no-fly zones, evacuating U.S. citizens, reinforcing key allies, and limited strikes and intervention. These operations will likely pose the most frequent challenge for U.S. forces and cumulatively require significant commitments over time.¹

The U.S. Army plays a major role in implementing this strategy, preventing regional destabilization, preventing conflict, and establishing a more secure environment.

The U.S. Army faces numerous threats throughout the world. Rather than enjoying a peace dividend, the U.S. Army has increased its deployments, primarily in operations other than war (OOTW).

History

The U.S. Army has a long history of involvement military operations other than war (MOOTW). Army involvement has escalated in recent years. Since 1990 the Army has participated in twenty-five deployments, nearly all of them OOTW. This compares with ten deployments of all types from 1950-1989.²

Since 1900 the Army has participated in over sixty operations that fit into the OOTW definition, compared to four high-intensity conflict deployments over the same period.³ Recent examples of U.S involvement in OOTW include humanitarian relief in Somalia and Rwanda, democracy preservation in Haiti, and peace building in Bosnia.

Traditional military combat power is not always the most appropriate means to achieve the nation's political objectives. This is reflected in a statement by former Army Chief of Staff General Gordon Sullivan:

Contemporary strategists confront representatives of feudal lords, religious groups, ethnic groups, drug cartels, crime syndicates and even transnational corporations using force or threats of force to achieve their objectives. Furthermore, nations now use operations other than war such as peacekeeping, peace enforcement, supervising cease-fires, assisting in the maintenance of law and order, protecting the delivery of humanitarian assistance, guaranteeing rights of passage and enforcement of sanctions, to compel adversaries to do their will.⁴

Doctrine

Special Operations forces have had repeated involvement with these operations; however, some of the forces deployed to OOTW operations are conventional forces in the active and reserve Army. Compared to Special Operations forces, these conventional forces are not familiar with the OOTW environment. In response to the frequency of deployments by conventional forces, the Army developed training packages at the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk and the Combat Maneuver Training Center in Hohenfels, Germany. The training centers struggled to capture tactics, techniques and

procedures (TTPs) while official doctrine tried to catch up with the changing environment.

The first mention of OOTW in Field Manual (FM) 100-5 is in the 1993 edition. The manual devotes an entire chapter to OOTW, defined as "military activities during peacetime and conflict that do not necessarily involve armed clashes between two organized forces."⁵ The manual's primary focus is on defining the environment, specifying the objectives of OOTW, and laying out the thirteen activities involved in OOTW ranging from humanitarian relief and disaster relief to attacks and raids.

FM 100-20, *Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict*, was published 5 December 1990. Prior to publishing the 1993 version of FM 100-5, OOTW was referred to as low intensity conflict (LIC) as indicated in titles of older manuals but will henceforth be referred to it as OOTW. The manual breaks down OOTW into four different areas: support for insurgency and counterinsurgency, combatting terrorism, peacekeeping operations, and peacetime contingency operations.⁶ The focus of the manual is on insurgency and counterinsurgency operations, and does not cover many of the OOTW missions U.S. forces are involved with today, nor does it incorporate any of the lessons learned from the numerous OOTW missions over the last decade.

FM 34-1, the Army's capstone manual for military intelligence doctrine, is consistent with the current version of FM 100-5. When describing the fundamentals of intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) support to OOTW it states, "The principles of IEW support apply equally to war and OOTW, the

needs of the commander in OOTW are often quite different from those of the commander in conventional combat operations.”⁷ The manual lays out generic support to OOTW and leaves the detailed doctrine of support to OOTW to FM 34-7, *Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Support to Low Intensity Conflict Operations*.

The U.S. Army is working these operations into its paradigm; however, a significant amount of the doctrine and technology remains focused on the Soviet-style threat in a high-intensity battlefield. While this remains the most dangerous threat to U.S. forces; however, frequency of OOTW mandates more attention be paid to these operations.

Research Question and Problem Statement

The researcher will identify the intelligence requirements for OOTW operations, and identify some unique tools available to answer these requirements. The increase in OOTW missions given to units today requires a new way of thinking and planning by commanders and their staffs. The wide range of missions involved in OOTW makes it difficult for commanders to know all of the information that they need. The proliferation of new technology and the increased amounts of information available often result in units focusing on the capabilities of the technology vice the needs of the commander. Information overload, frequently slows the decision-making process, rather than increasing the timeliness and accuracy of decisions. These problems are not new and have not been created by technology; rather they are exacerbated with the greater

access to information. With the increasing importance of intelligence and communications failure to provide the right intelligence to the right people, at the right time threatens the success of operations. Doctrine has not kept up with the changing missions of the Army. Current intelligence publications cover OOTW operations, but are over seven years old.

This thesis addresses the following questions:

1. What are the commander's intelligence requirements during OOTW and how can they be satisfied?

The following secondary questions are addressed in order to answer the primary questions:

1. What is the current doctrine for intelligence requirements for OOTW?
2. What are the information requirements of tactical commanders involved in OOTW?
3. What are the gaps between current intelligence doctrine and the information requirements involved in the case studies?
4. What new aspects of technology can assist the commander to identify priority intelligence requirements during OOTW?
5. How can the staff best satisfy the commander's intelligence requirements?

Definition of Terms

Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIR). Information required by the commander that directly affects his decisions and dictates the successful execution of operational or tactical operations. CCIR normally result in the generation of three types of information requirements: priority intelligence requirements (PIR), friendly force information requirements (FFIR), and essential elements of friendly information (EEFI).⁸

Humanitarian Assistance. Assistance provided by Department of Defense (DOD) forces, as directed by appropriate authority, in the aftermath of natural or man-made disasters to help reduce conditions that present a serious threat to life and property; assistance provided by U.S. forces is limited in scope and duration and is designed to supplement efforts of civilian authorities who have primary responsibility for providing such assistance.⁹

Information Requirement. An intelligence requirement of lower priority than the PIR of the lowest priority.¹⁰

Intelligence Requirements. A requirement for intelligence to fill a gap in the command's knowledge and understanding of the battlefield or threat forces. Intelligence requirements are designed to reduce the uncertainties associated with successful completion of a specific course of action (COA). Intelligence requirements that support decisions which affect the overall mission accomplishment are designated by the commander as PIR.¹¹

Nation Assistance. Diplomatic, economic, informational, and military cooperation between the U.S. and the government of another nation, with the objective of promoting internal development and the growth of sustainable institutions within that nation. This corrects conditions that cause human suffering and improves the quality of life of the nation's people.¹²

Operations Other Than War (OOTW). Military activities during peacetime and conflict that do not necessarily involve armed clashes between two organized forces.¹³

Peace Enforcement. Military intervention to forcefully restore peace between belligerents who may be engaged in combat.¹⁴

Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR). An intelligence requirement associated with a decision that will affect the overall success of the command's mission. PIR are a subset of intelligence requirements of a higher priority than information requirements. PIR are prioritized among themselves and may change in priority over the course of the operations conduct. Only the commander designates PIR.¹⁵

Assumptions

The primary assumption used during the research is intelligence requirements of past operations will be applicable, in a general sense (same type of information), for operations in the future.

Limitation

This paper is designed to give commanders and their staffs a starting point for developing their intelligence requirements for OOTW. The paper will focus on how to develop these PIRs, rather than giving generic answers to specific questions. The wide range of missions within OOTW makes giving answers to specific questions difficult as the range of information requirements possible is infinite. Every commander has a specific way of visualizing the battlefield or operations. This paper will give the commander a range in which to shape the picture of very complex and unique situations.

Delimitation

This paper restricts research to operations beginning with Operation Just Cause until current operations in Bosnia. It looks at After Action Reviews (AARs) from Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) and Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) that evaluate the mission readiness evaluations (MREs) for units deploying to OOTW missions. Information requirements outside the intelligence field are not examined.

There are three constraints that make the task manageable and enable completion of the project within the time frame. First the researcher will use the doctrinal definition of PIRs to identify the requirements for commanders in an OOTW environment. Second, the researcher will limit the research to official orders and AARs for each of the operations. Third, the researcher will only use

unclassified material, or material that can be declassified for the study. There are no other constraints on research for this thesis.

A review of all relevant information available at the Combined Arms Research Library (CARL), Command and General Staff College, including other theses and monographs revealed that no other study has been conducted on this problem. There are numerous other studies covering topics, such as Intelligence lessons learned in OOTW operations, whether the current intelligence structure can support OOTW operations, and the effectiveness of human intelligence in OOTW operations.

Significance of the Study

The overall purpose of this study is to determine the information requirements of a commander in OOTW operations and the best assets to use in order to answer these requirements. The researcher will study a small, but critical, portion of the commander's critical information requirements. The researcher will focus on the intelligence requirements commanders need to make timely decisions. In addition, the researcher will identify intelligence capability to assist in answering intelligence requirements. The study will review actual operations to determine what intelligence requirements were, and techniques, that can be used to answer the requirements. The analysis and conclusions will provide commanders and military intelligence professionals, not familiar with conducting OOTW operations, an updated look at current OOTW operations, and the techniques used that resulted in operational success or failure.

¹The White House, *A National Security Strategy For A New Century* (Washington, DC: The White House, October 1998), 21.

²Togo D. West and Dennis J. Reimer, "America's Army, The Force of Decision for Today, Tomorrow and the 21st Century: A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army, Fiscal Year 1998," Posture Statement presented to the 105th Congress, 1st session (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 1997), 42.

³John M. Collins, *America's Small Wars: Lessons for the Future* (McLean, VA Brassey's (US), Inc., 1991): 2.

⁴Gordon R. Sullivan, "Land Warfare in the 21st Century," *Military Review* 73 no. 9 (September 1993), 19.

⁵U.S. Army, FM 100-5, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, June 1993), Glossary 7.

⁶U.S. Army, FM 100-20, *Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, December 1990), 1-6.

⁷U.S. Army, FM 34-1, *Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, June 1993), 6-1.

⁸U.S. Army, FM 101-5-1, *Operational Terms and Graphics* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, September 1997), 1-34.

⁹*Ibid.*, Glossary 4.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, Glossary-7.

¹¹*Ibid.*

¹²FM 100-5, Glossary 6.

¹³*Ibid.*

¹⁴*Ibid.*, Glossary 7.

¹⁵U.S. Army, FM 34-130, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, July 1994), Glossary-9.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

There are several resources that assisted in answering the research question. The sources include doctrine, operational documents, scholarly works on related subjects, and books, magazines and periodicals.

Identifying commander's critical information requirements is not a new concept. The availability of literature, both from the military and civilian sector, on this subject is significant. The focus of the existing literature is on the mechanics of intelligence support to OOTW. The primary contribution of this paper is to identify the minimum intelligence requirements in OOTW missions. With this baseline in place, systems providing the commander information can be better focused, and the battle staff made more efficient and better able to meet the commander's needs.

Doctrine

To develop an understanding of OOTW operations the researcher looked at several doctrinal publications. FM 100-5, *Operations*, provided the background for OOTW and how it fits into the overall Army doctrine. FM 100-5 addressed the thirteen fundamental missions involved in OOTW, providing the context within which each mission takes place. Joint publication 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, provided a joint understanding of OOTW and clarified the differences in the three types of peace operations. FM 100-20, *Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict*, provided the current doctrine for OOTW

operations. FM 100-20 was published prior to the current version of FM 100-5, and contains outdated terms and concepts for OOTW operations. However, it did provide useful background data used to examine the current doctrine.

In researching the intelligence doctrine in support of OOTW operations several publications were of use to include: FM 34-1, *Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations*, provided the fundamentals and principles of intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) support to OOTW operations. FM 34-130, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)*, provided background on intelligence requirements within the IPB process. FM 34-7, *Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Support to Low-Intensity Conflict Operations*, provided the primary doctrinal reference for determining intelligence requirements for OOTW operations. This manual was published prior to the current version of FM 100-5 and uses the doctrinal missions and requirements in support of FM 100-20.

Operational Documents

This area consisted of a wide range of original and digitized documents including operation orders (OPORDs), situation reports (SITREPs) and fragmentary orders (FRAGOs), commander's briefings, and oral and written interviews. A large amount of the data was classified information; however, there was sufficient data at the unclassified level to research the primary and secondary questions of this thesis.

To gather information concerning assessments and reviews of the four primary operations, the researcher used the Center for Army Lessons Learned

(CALL) databases and special published reports. The collation of the AARs provided some of the best material for the research of the thesis.

Related Scholarly Works

There exists a wide range of scholarly works that aided in the research of the problem. Works from the Masters of Military Art and Science (MMAS) theses, the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) monographs, and Strategic Research Projects from the Army War College provided the bulk of the information used from these sources.

The subjects of these papers were broken down into two categories. The first were papers on the specific operations with titles such as "Tactical Intelligence Support in Somalia: Lessons Learned," "The Effectiveness of Human Intelligence in Operation Uphold Democracy," and "Operation Just Cause, Lessons for Operations Other Than War." The second category included papers on OOTW and included "Information-Related Operations in Smaller-Scale Contingencies," "Peace Operations from an Intelligence Perspective," and "Military Power in Operations Other Than War."

Books, Magazines, and Periodicals

Magazines

In this area several works were found that provided background on each of the operations and the experiences of individuals and units that participated. Articles, such as "*Wilderness Guide: Intelligence for the Commander in Bosnia*,"

"Intelligence and the Peacekeeper in Haiti," and *"Memories of Somalia,"* provided valuable insight for the research.

Books

The books used in the research also focused on the specific operations, defining OOTW in general. Works on the specific operations included *Lessons From Bosnia: The IFOR Experience*, *Operation Just Cause*, *The Storming of Panama*, and *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned*. Books used to define OOTW in general included *Confrontation Analysis: How to Win Operations Other Than War*, and *America's Small Wars*.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Chapters 1 and 2 focused on the purpose of the study and previous research in this area. This chapter provides the research methodology and the analytical thought process used for the study. This chapter focuses on how the researcher plans on completing the study, rather than the outcomes and conclusions, which will be addressed in later chapters.

The research is in four phases. The first phase is a review of current doctrine and scholarly works defining OOTW and the intelligence requirements to support it. The second phase looks at four OOTW operations U.S. forces have participated in over the last twenty years. The third phase looks at collection methods, both traditional and nontraditional, that assist in answering the intelligence requirements during OOTW operations. The final phase consists of analysis of the three previous phases to answer the primary research question.

The first phase of the research will define the doctrinal principles for OOTW operations and the required intelligence support. The current versions of FM 100-5, *Operations*, and FM 100-20, *Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict*, provide the basis for the examination of OOTW missions. FM 34-1, *Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations*, sets out a framework for intelligence support to operations, and FM 34-7, *Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Support to LIC Operations*, sets out the specifics for intelligence support to OOTW operations. FM 34-7 gives sample Intelligence requirements for various OOTW operations and illustrates the basic principles for intelligence

support in a theoretical environment. The written product of this phase is in chapter 4.

The second phase looks at four OOTW operations U.S. forces have participated in over the last twenty years. The research examines the operations to determine if the doctrine for OOTW operations were applied. If doctrine was not used, the research identifies what intelligence requirements were used and if they were appropriately applied. The research examines the following four operations: Operation Just Cause (1989), Operation Restore Hope (1993-1994), Operation Uphold Democracy (1994), and Joint Endeavor (1995-present). The research looks at what the initial intelligence requirements were for each operation and how the requirements developed during the operation. The next step is to look at AARs and published reports for each of the operations to see if the best requirements were developed, and if not what could have been done better. Various AARs, lessons-learned documents, joint universal lessons learned system (JULLS) reports, and other assessments will provide the basis for the compilation of lessons learned. Research of publications in the CARL and the CALL will ensure gaps in the analysis of these operations are covered. The key to this phase is not to determine whether the involved units were right or wrong, but to compare what was initially thought to be important, versus what the commander actually needed to conduct the operation. The researcher will look at the results of this examination in chapters 4 and 5.

The third phase of research looks at the various collection methods and intelligence sources used in the four operations examined. It reviews the unique

collection methods used to collect against the intelligence requirements for each OOTW operation. The researcher will review the results of this examination in chapters 4 and 5.

The research approach used will examine the operations in the following manner. This paper evaluates the initial intelligence requirements used in each operation and compares them with what was actually collected and analyzed. Next the paper determines whether the information requirements used during the operation are contained in current doctrine or established TTPs. Finally, the lessons learned and AARs, are critically examined to ensure they reflect the experiences of the participants in the operation. The goal of the evaluation is to come up with intelligence requirements based on actual operations that are not currently in established doctrine.

The final phase of research determines a common thread of success between operations. This includes actions taken or not taken in each operation. In addition, research addresses new technologies and methods available to commanders that units have used in recent OOTW operations.

It is important to note that the author, as a military intelligence officer and as a direct participant in one of the operations being studied, has certain biases. The research overcomes this problem through presentation of overwhelming facts to support each of the recommendations.

A second problem arises in determining the conclusions of the various operations. This paper avoids official recommendations or positions and focuses solely on the facts of the operations.

With the wide range of operations examined, the researcher will rely solely on document collection and review in obtaining the facts for the operations. As discussed earlier the primary source of information will be the CARL and the CALL. Research also uses other documents from outside sources.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Introduction

Intelligence requirements for OOTW are significantly different from conventional operations. Requirements vary considerably within the various operations that are under the umbrella of OOTW which ranges from noncombatant evacuation operations to attacks and raids.

In this work the term OOTW refers to the following missions contained under the OOTW umbrella as defined by FM 100-5, *Operations*: humanitarian assistance, nation assistance, and peace enforcement.

There are considerable similarities in the intelligence requirements between the operations examined; many of these intelligence requirements are not contained in the current doctrine. The intelligence battlefield operating system proved to be extremely flexible and quickly adapted in each of the operations. Human intelligence was by far the intelligence source of choice in these operations; however, other intelligence sources also made significant contributions. The data for this work was obtained reviewing the current doctrine for military intelligence support to OOTW, and a review of the operations orders and AARs for the following OOTW operations: Operation Just Cause, Operation Restore Hope, Operation Uphold Democracy, and Operation Joint Endeavor.

Purpose

The overall purpose of this study is to determine the information requirements of a commander in OOTW operations and the best assets to use in order to answer these requirements. Research focuses on a small, but critical, portion of the commander's critical information requirements. Research focuses on the priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) commanders need to make timely decisions. The study reviews actual operations to determine what the intelligence requirements were and techniques, doctrinal or developed during the course of this paper, that can be used to answer the requirements. The analysis and conclusions will provide commanders and Military Intelligence professionals, not familiar with conducting OOTW operations, an updated look at current OOTW operations and the techniques used to satisfy intelligence requirements in these operations.

Questions

The primary thesis question is: What are the commander's intelligence requirements during OOTW, and how can they be satisfied?

The following secondary questions are addressed in order to answer the primary questions:

1. What is the current doctrine for intelligence requirements for OOTW?
2. What are the information requirements of tactical commanders involved in OOTW?

3. What are the gaps between current intelligence doctrine and the information requirements involved in the case studies?
4. What new aspects of technology can assist the commander to identify priority intelligence requirements during OOTW?
5. How can the staff best satisfy the commander's intelligence requirements?

Doctrinal Review

What is the current doctrine for intelligence requirements for OOTW?

The determination of intelligence requirements in support of OOTW operations should begin with a thorough review of the current doctrine. Doctrinal principles are derived primarily from FM 34-7, *Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Support to Low-Intensity Conflict Operations*. The Intelligence School published this manual just prior to the 1993 version of FM 100-5 was published and before the term OOTW became doctrinal. In describing intelligence support to OOTW the manual uses the four operational categories previously used under the LIC doctrine. The categories are: support for insurgency and counterinsurgency, combatting terrorism, peacekeeping operations (PKO), and peacetime contingency operations (PCO).¹ Of the four categories only the requirements for peacekeeping operations were examined because they fit most closely with humanitarian assistance, nation assistance, and peace enforcement, the three types of operations examined in the thesis. Requirements for the three other

types of missions addressed in the current version of FM 34-7 were not addressed because they are not within the scope of this paper.

Under the current doctrine for intelligence support to peacekeeping operations the focus of intelligence operations during predeployment is collecting information necessary for staff planning. Determining if the information exists, what is the best source, where it can be found, if it is valid, organized, and accessible are the primary missions of the intelligence staff. In addition, the intelligence staff will determine who has physically been on site, and who speaks the language.²

As part of a checklist used to describe the belligerents the following information requirements were recommended:

1. Identify all factions involved in the PKO. Which are likely to violate the peace and why?
2. What is the political organization and military order of battle (OB) for each of the belligerent groups? Who are the key personnel that control the rank and file of each faction?
3. Identify the political organization and religious beliefs that directly affect or influence the conduct of the belligerents?
4. Identify belligerent tactics for offense and defense. Use this as the basis for doctrinal templates.
5. Identify local support to all belligerents.³

The recommendations for PIR criteria for PKO taken from FM 34-7 are that they be almost exclusively indications and warning (I&W) of possible violations by either belligerent. They should focus on force protection.⁴

The collection recommendations in FM 34-7 focused initially on where the information could best be found. Does the higher headquarters have the information, can any element from the peacekeeping force answer the requirement, and does the information already exist in an analytical database.⁵

The collection assets recommended for use were primarily human intelligence (HUMINT), using observers and patrolling reporting to give I&W of hostilities among belligerents. Use of signals intelligence (SIGINT) and imagery intelligence (IMINT) was not discussed as it was assumed it would not be available. One final recommendation was to use the multidiscipline counterintelligence estimate to protect the peacekeepers.⁶

The current doctrinal manual was very broad in its doctrine for peacekeeping operations, and what was available does not correspond with the OOTW missions as described in the current FM 100-5. The Intelligence School is developing new doctrine for current OOTW missions, but it is not officially available at this time.

The other intelligence manual examined was FM 34-130, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)*. FM 34-130 is intended to serve as a guide for the use of IPB by units of all types, at all echelons, across the entire spectrum of conflict, and during the conduct of any missions. The 1994 version of FM 34-130 was published after the 1993 version of FM 100-5, and contains a chapter on

OOTW outlining intelligence methods for each of the thirteen missions under the OOTW umbrella.

Looking at the three missions (humanitarian assistance, nation assistance, peace enforcement), FM 34-130 goes into further detail on the intelligence requirements for humanitarian assistance and peace enforcement missions, not covering nation assistance. The manual does not recommend PIR for the operations, what it does do is give areas to look at when evaluating the threat.

The following was taken from the manual for recommendations while evaluating the threat for Peace Enforcement operations:

1. Fully identify all belligerent groups.
2. What is the relationship of each group to every other group -- allied, neutral, or hostile?
3. What is the political organization of each group? What are the political objectives of each group? How strong are each of their convictions?
4. How much discipline can the leadership of each group expect from their followers? How likely are rank and file members to violate a truce negotiated by their leaders?
5. Fully identify the military capability of each group.
6. What friendly COAs would induce the belligerents to obey the law?⁷

The following was taken from the manual for recommendations while evaluating the threat for Humanitarian Assistance operations:

1. Consider the weather and environment as potential threats.

2. The environment may pose threats to the health of both mission and HN personnel in the forms of waterborne diseases, spoiled or contaminated foodstuffs, and other environmental hazards.

3. Identify and evaluate the threat posed by any groups that may oppose friendly force operations. Consider groups that may clandestinely oppose the operation even though they publicly pledge support.

4. Consider initially neutral groups and personnel that may become hostile as the operation progresses.

5. When confronted with riots or similar threats, identify "opinion makers" and other influential members of the local population. Identify potential trouble spots and contentious issues.⁸

With both types of operations varying greatly in both mission and requirements to accomplish the mission, there are two commonalities between the commander's intelligence requirements. First is identifying underlying hostile forces that pose a threat to friendly forces once the operation begins. Second is identifying the players in the area of operations.

The doctrine for identifying intelligence requirements for each of the types of operations provides a good baseline. However, the doctrine was written before the current version of FM 100-5 was published, and before many of the current deployments of U.S. forces were evaluated.

Information Requirements

What are the information requirements of tactical commanders involved in OOTW?

Intelligence requirements to support OOTW differ in type and scope from requirements that are most important in the conventional war “decide, detect, deliver” approach to winning battles. In conventional high-intensity war, the emphasis is on high-technology sensors designed to find massed enemy forces. In Cold War conventional situations, a lot is known about enemy organization, equipment, doctrine, and tactics thus analysis of the sensor-provided “picture” enables confident assessment of enemy courses of action. In OOTW, killing “the enemy” is not the focus. Intelligence must first determine if there is an enemy, who he is, and how he operates.⁹

In order to determine if there was a common linkage in the information requirements and PIRs for each operation, it is necessary to see what commanders initially perceived as their requirements and what their actual requirements were once the operation started were the same. The purpose was to determine if there is a common linkage of the PIRs and IRs between the types of missions under OOTW, or if each was independent of the other. Common linkages were evident in general requirements identified by all leaders and units prior to commencing operations. The methods to answer these requirements varied between the operations, and are covered later in this paper.

Cultural Background

Although the operations looked at were considerably different, there was one constant thread for all the operations. The commander on the ground needs a good understanding of the culture he operates in as well as a broad and regional situation awareness. This includes an understanding of the history of the area, demographics, customs, mores, and the political and criminal as well as military situation. More importantly, he must understand how these interact to produce effects. The U.S. forces' difficulty in relating to and understanding non-Western culture only makes this process more challenging.

In Operation Just Cause (Panama) development of this cultural background was relatively easy because U.S. forces were stationed in Panama. They were involved with the Panamanian people on a daily basis, understood many of their frustrations with Manuel Noriega and his corrupt regime, and U.S. forces had been watching the Panama situation develop for at least eighteen months.

The development of this extensive background was much more difficult for the other three operations examined. In Operation Restore Hope (Somalia) there was less time to develop the information, approximately thirty days, and there were no, or very little sources from which to gain information. Like Operation Just Cause, commanders needed a good knowledge and understanding of the culture and general situation. This was much more difficult to develop. Much of the general information available in open sources was outdated. Units going into

Somalia knew very little about the people, their relationship with each other, or their attitudes about U.S. forces on their soil.

Understanding the culture was fundamental to success. Somali's were very intelligent, quick to manipulate any negotiation to their clan's advantage, clan-centric and xenophobic. Western perceptions distorted accurate analysis of Somali behavior, a critical understanding for intelligence personnel as they attempted to support their commanders diplomatically and tactically.

Clan rivalry was at the heart of every dispute. They would continue to fight and kill each other for nothing more than the continuing struggle to establish clan preeminence, a situation that was very difficult for Americans to understand. A review of the Somali reaction to the ranger operations in October 1993 shows the Army did not have a good understanding of the Somali warrior ethos.¹⁰ While misunderstanding of the culture was clearly highlighted in Somalia with dramatic results, it was also clearly evident in other operations.

Commander's success in Operation Joint Endeavor (Bosnia) was first and foremost an appreciation for the culture and history of this complex region. After this, detailed and specific knowledge of the area of operations was required. This included the military leaders and organizations in the area, the civilian leadership, the political structure, leadership and practices, the political party structure and its leadership, refugee organizations and their leadership, and the paramilitary situation.¹¹

Operation Uphold Democracy dealt with a society rampant with poverty and corruption, where Catholicism and voodoo existed side by side, and where

political, military, police and criminal organizations, and interests overlapped.¹²

Port-au-Prince is an area with beautiful homes and well-manicured lawns just blocks from some of the worst slums on earth.

Threat

The second consistency in every operation was the need to identify the threat to U.S. forces. Force protection was at the forefront of every commander's concern throughout the conduct of operations. In recent interventions, force protection sometimes took precedence over accomplishment of the overall mission.¹³ Personnel involved in Joint Endeavor often felt force protection was the mission. The threat while varied included threats from factions, clans, tribes, families, political organizations, military and paramilitary organizations, criminal organizations, and even the government structure and their leaders.

A quote from Major General William Nash, Commander, Task for Eagle, Operation Joint Endeavor, Bosnia-Herzegovina, fully captures the criticality that force protection plays in peace operations. The tactical mission success achieved in such a volatile environment can be in part attributed to the command emphasis that he placed on "protecting the force."

Force protection . . . goes to the heart of our successful mission accomplishment. Our ability to avoid casualties, to protect the force, will directly impact our ability to successfully perform the peace enforcement mission. And there're two aspects of that . . . that compound our ability, that directly lend themselves to mission accomplishment in force protection. The first, of course, has to do with the will of the American people to sustain this operation. And . . . as the American people and the leadership of the nation see success, with minimal casualties, their propensity to support the operation will remain high. Second, as the former Warring Factions see our ability to conduct operations without

sustaining casualties, it adds to our "aura" or proficiency and competence on the part of NATO forces, in particular, American forces. And that gives us even greater, if you will, moral ascendancy over them, as we go about our business. So the force protection, while it is a sufficiently important subject on its own right, it also is a major contributor to our combat power in accomplishing our mission.¹⁴

The concept of enemy is dynamic rather than static. The enemy changes with time. These changes come about from actions at the tactical, operational, or strategic levels. The key is continually tracking the attitudes of the people, and how they perceive the conduct of the mission. One of the first things that must be determined is the extent of commitment of each party to the truce, cease-fire, humanitarian assistance operation, or nation building effort. The importance of tracking mission perceptions is addressed later in this paper.

During Operation Uphold Democracy the task force commander considered force protection a key element of the mission and his number one priority.¹⁵ Initially the military threat was minimal. The Haitians had a small military of little consequence, possessing a few heavy machine guns and a few motorized armored personnel carriers. The main antagonists once on the ground were the Armed Forces of Haiti (FAD'H) under the control of the Cedras regime. The Front for the Progress and Advancement of Haiti (FRAPH) (a right wing political organization run under the cover of the Cedras regime accused of terror attacks on civilians), and to a lesser extent the Lavalas (President Aristide's political party) were also main belligerents. Analysts knew some of the paramilitary leaders prior to initiation of operations, but much information on these organizations was developed once on the ground. This was a complex

problem because the aforementioned organizations had both formal and informal power structures. Analysts developed extensive databases and conducted extensive analysis to unravel the organizations and identify the real leaders. Once identified, these leaders were monitored or arrested if they posed a threat to security.¹⁶

Concurrently with the neutralization of the paramilitary organizations, intelligence began supporting general anticrime efforts by the military police. During later stages of Operation Uphold Democracy, intelligence began to support presidential elections. Political IPB was conducted. The focus included names of primary candidates, headquarters of the majority party, electoral headquarters, and others. Target folders were fully developed on potential "hot spots" throughout the country. A more focused emphasis on the area of operations was implemented that included the electoral headquarters, lines of communications, attitudes of workers and voters in selected regions of the city, and potential problems that may occur during the elections.¹⁷

The following is a list of Task Force (TF) Mountain's initial PIRs as they entered the Haiti:

1. What is the threat to U.S. Forces and personnel? Special attention to the FRAPH.
2. Who are opposition leaders with potential for violence against U.S. operations, and what are their activities?

3. What are the disposition and intention of key Fad'H units? Special attention to the heavy weapons company (HWC), the harbor defense unit (HDU), and the 4th and 22nd Companies of the Haitian Police Force.

4. What are the most likely participants, locations, and conditions for Haitian on Haitian violence?

5. Where is humanitarian assistance needed most critically within Haiti? What are the implications of perceived shortfalls in assistance?¹⁸

In Somalia all initial PIRs dealt with discerning the major threats to carrying out relief operations and threats to U.S. forces. Intelligence requirements included, whether warlords or factions would interfere with the relief effort, how equipment, to include artillery pieces would be positioned, the location of clans and differentiation between clan members and members of United Nations (UN) contracted security forces.

Initial IRs focused on determining the capabilities of the factions and clans, their organization and leadership, and level of training. Other priorities for collection included information on rogue gangs, arms cache's, arms markets and location of unauthorized weapons. The development of targetable intelligence was extremely difficult.¹⁹

The following is a list of TF Mountain's initial PIRs as they entered the Somalia:²⁰

1. Will any Somali warlord or faction interfere with UN and US relief efforts? If so, which ones, how, and with what equipment?

2. What is the location and strength of warlord and faction artillery and mortars? What capabilities do they possess for movement?
3. Where are armor and tracked vehicles located? What are patterns of movement?
4. What are the distinguishing characteristics between technicals and UN contracted security forces and other groups?
5. Where are the armed factions and groups and their leaders located within TF Mountain's area of operation?

In Bosnia the initial PIRs focused on a combination of identifying threats to U.S. Forces, determining the disposition of the former warring factions (FWF), and looking at the terrain and infrastructure in the area of operations.

In Bosnia the threat environment is extremely complex. Besides the "conventional" armed forces of each side, there are numerous paramilitary organizations. In 1994, a UN report identified eighty-three paramilitary groups fighting in Bosnia and Croatia, of which fifty-six were Serb, thirteen Croat and fourteen Bosnian Muslim (Bosniac). Many of these units, though not at the time active as military units, still existed as loose organizations in 1996. Because they were more like Mafiosi than military, obtaining reliable and detailed information on these organizations and their members was extremely difficult. Tracking the unit was more like police detective work than classic intelligence collection. The key to everything was the people. Who was in charge, what are their interests, what did they have to lose or gain. This information was very hard to track, but the best methods of collecting this information was directly asking the person

involved, then talking with his friends, enemies, acquaintances to either confirm or deny the information.

During Operation Just Cause area specialists were not up to date on country background. Databases of local individuals of interest had not been kept current, and loyal sources had not been developed.²¹ The strength of the Panamanian Defense Forces' (PDF) Dignity Battalions was significantly higher than expected. Factors such as civilian population, logistics sustainability, or critical resource and economic areas were not developed although these factors may be crucial in OOTW where civilian responses, including massive flight, passive support for the enemy, or overt aggression, must be foreseen and prepared for.²² The unanticipated result was the widespread looting in Panama City that followed the U.S. assault. A secondary threat in Panama was the criminal element that developed within the country before the invasion. Destabilizing forces found support among the criminal disaffected elements who were unable to realize the same profits (whether political or economically) as under Noriega.²³

Nature of the Operating Environment

While seemingly obvious, and closely related to conventional operations, the physical nature of the environment that U.S. forces operate in was a key factor in many of the initial decisions made by U.S. forces. Serviceability of airports and airfields, existing road networks, and availability of repair parts or building material were critical factors in each of these operations.

In Operation Restore Hope the primary concern was the condition and serviceability of airfields, ports, and lines of communications within TF mountain's area of operation. In Humanitarian Assistance operations, establishing a robust distribution system for private organizations to use is vital. Information concerning the location of well sites, schools, markets, hospitals, churches-mosques, and police stations became more important as forces attempt to help restore infrastructure to facilitate the relief operation. In addition, the medical status of the population is usually important.²⁴

During the initial stages of Uphold Democracy it was necessary to determine the status of the nations infrastructure to both set priorities and provide facilities protection for Civil Affairs operations.

At the beginning of Operation Promote Liberty, the Commander, Civil-Military Operations Task Force (COMCMOTF) needed to determine the status of and protect significant activities, such as those which provided water and power, banks, and government buildings. In addition, the COMCMOTF worked to get Tocumen International Airport reopened, and other services and activities restarted.²⁵

Internal Violence

The potential for internal violence (i.e., Haitian-on-Haitian, Bosnian-on-Croat, etc.) was great in every operation studied. This type of activity is a underlying difference from conventional operations. The threat to U.S. forces is getting caught up in the violence, leading to an even further escalation of the

problem. Anticipation of incidents likely to incite violence was key. In each of the cases studied the greatest reason for the violence was primarily revenge for earlier atrocities or repression by the regime formerly in power.

In Haiti the greatest and most frequent conflict, was between the FRAPH party, supporters of the former dictator Cedras, and the Lavalas Party, supporters of President Aristide. Early in the deployment of the 10th Mountain forces in Port-au-Prince there was a massive rally in which violence did occur resulting in several deaths. This was a prelude to further violence and greatly influenced the intelligence requirements of U.S. forces.

The case in Panama was similar. Conflict was between the supporters of the newly installed government looking to exact revenge on supporters of Manuel Noriega and members of the Dignity Battalions.

The greatest threat to U.S. forces in Bosnia, was the areas where the FWF, were separated after four years of war and atrocities. U.S. forces were constantly vigilant of the location of opposing factions so they could defuse potential violence.

Weapons

Identifying weapons cache's was key in three of the operations examined. Reducing the number of weapons available to the populace, former or current belligerents, or former members of the police or military greatly reduced the risk of future violence.

In Operation Just Cause and Operation Uphold Democracy an extensive and successful weapons buy-back program was established. During Operation Just Cause the amount of weapons stockpiled by Noriega was far greater than estimated.²⁶ The program was well publicized in each instance, and deemed successful for both operations.

Locating and disarming Haitian paramilitary organizations who posed a direct threat to President Aristide was of more concern than understanding the military and became the focus of the operation for the first month. The centerpiece of initial operations in Haiti was Mountain Strike raids conducted by the 10th Mountain Division directed at seizing weapons caches. The raids were centered on intelligence from HUMINT sources, and conducted by the 10th Mountain forces in order to minimize the amount of weapons available for future operations. The results of the raids were very successful:

Between 1 and 18 October, MNF Haiti conducted 38 raids on suspected weapons cache sites; 23 sites had concrete results seizing weapons, wanted individuals, drugs, counterfeit money. The operations successfully captured eight of ten individuals on the MNF's "most wanted" list of dangerous persons. Mountain Strikes were limited after the return of President Aristide and restoration of the legitimate government of Haiti. By that time, the principal political enemy of President Aristide, the FRAPH, was thoroughly disrupted.²⁷

Perception of the Mission

The perception of the host-nation people is critical. Identifying the attitudes of the belligerents toward U.S. forces, and when those attitudes are becoming hostile is critical. What may start out as a positive operation, can quickly result in a negative perception by the population. Attitudes of both

friendly and hostile forces must continually be checked. Friendly populations can quickly turn hostile if their perception of the progress of the operation does not meet their expectations.

Operation Restore Hope is an excellent example of this. One of the intelligence failures of the operation was how U.S. forces anticipated being welcomed as they came into country. The vision of U.S. Navy SEALs arriving on the beach only to be welcomed by the U.S. and International Press illustrate this. Rather than the hostile reception U.S. forces expected, they were welcomed by the Somali people. Once the operation began the situation began to slowly deteriorate, often not because of what was happening on the tactical level, but what was happening on the operational and strategic level. This continuous down turn in the relations between U.S. forces and the Somali people came to a brutal climax with the battle of Mogadishu where eighteen U.S. servicemen were killed.

Another example of this occurred with the Marines in Lebanon. Over months, the environment continued to deteriorate around the Marines, but leaders from the national level through those on the ground failed to fully comprehend the nature of the changes. The Marines compromised their neutrality in the eyes of the Muslim factions when they were directed to train the Lebanese Army. Muslim radicals bombed the American Embassy compound. Syria rejected a withdrawal agreement with Israel negotiated with the aid of the U.S., emboldening the Druze militia, and the Druze sporadically attacked the Marines with rockets.²⁸

During Operation Joint Endeavor, Task Force Eagle (TFE) was kept a constant "pulse" of the environment resulting in today's good situation. The Task Force was continually asking what was different today as compared to yesterday. This allowed TFE to take action to ensure the peace was maintained and soldiers remained protected. Several times it allowed TFE to preempt problems before they occurred.²⁹

U.S. Forces in support of Promote Liberty continually had to fight the perception of what their mission was to the Panamanian people. It had to be very clear that US forces mission was "liberation and not occupation."³⁰

Gaps In Doctrine

What are the gaps between current intelligence doctrine and the information requirements involved in the case studies?

The important thing to consider in looking at intelligence requirements is that no two operations, deployments, or situations are ever the same. Recommendation of potential Intelligence requirements identifies what was key to operational success in the past, and makes recommendations for future operations. The recommended intelligence requirements in military intelligence doctrine today for humanitarian assistance, nation assistance, and peace enforcement cover two key areas identification of a threat and the physical environment. Beyond this, the only other reference in doctrine to PIRs is identified in FM 34-7 and states, "These will be almost exclusively Indications

and Warning (I&W) of possible violations be either belligerent. They should focus on force protection.”³¹

The following six areas were identified as driving Intelligence requirements in the four case studies examined. They are: cultural background, threat, nature of the operating environment, internal violence, weapons, and perception of the mission.

Two of the six areas definitely fall within the current doctrine, threat and nature of the operating environment. While cultural background is not specified as a specific intelligence requirement in either FM 34-130 or FM 34-7, it is strongly implied within each manual, as a starting point for OOTW operations.

Three of the six intelligence requirements, internal violence, weapons, and perception of the mission were not identified in the doctrinal manuals reviewed. There was a clear necessity for these requirements in the operations examined, and they need to be considered in future operations of this type.

Collection

What new aspects of technology can assist in identifying and satisfying the commanders PIR during OOTW? How can the staff best satisfy the commander's intelligence requirements?

Examination of the intelligence requirements for OOTW reveals they are not easily satisfied. They require a detailed knowledge of, and thorough interaction with, target cultures and nations. Much of the strategic and operational information is gleaned from open sources, such as country and

scholarly studies, but the detailed information concerning the nations tactical operations must come from human and technical collection.

According to doctrine, and confirmed by this study, the most prevalent intelligence source for OOTW operations is HUMINT. The development and level of visibility of HUMINT in OOTW operations has grown from its infancy during Operation Just Cause, to overwhelming reliance in Bosnia today.

New technologies being provided to HUMINT teams are especially significant. The Theater Rapid Response Intelligence Package (TRRIP), is a prototype notebook computer-based data acquisition, management, and communication system designed to meet counterintelligence (CI) requirements. The TRRIP is the first automated system specifically designed to meet the needs of U.S. Army counterintelligence agents. A follow-on system currently being fielded to U.S. Army units to replace the TRRIP is the CI-HUMINT intelligence automated tool set (CHATS).

The sources of HUMINT include: Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), humanitarian organizations, religious organizations, military observers, Special Forces activities, military doctors and dentists working in local community, commanders, civil affairs, and diplomatic efforts. In Somalia there were no less than thirty international humanitarian and six UN humanitarian organizations. Communicating with various agencies can be a challenge, but developing a solid working relationship is worth the effort. A good, common sense and yet "out-of-the-box" approach to analysis of information sources always yields productive results.

HUMINT reporting is particularly important in OOTW operations because it provides information that is difficult to collect by sophisticated overhead and other technical means. In preparing for the Somali entry, U.S. planners and commanders needed specific information about the intentions and military capabilities of the various Somali subclans. Technical collection means were unable to provide adequate information about trucks, jeeps with crew-served weapons and the few pieces of armor that constituted the Somali weapon inventories. As one intelligence officer put it, "Someone was needed to locate and count them from the ground and find out if they were operational."³² The key is exploitation of every possible source who has contact with the public. One J-2 collection manager in Somalia believed that a large majority of his intelligence requirements could have been satisfied had efficient use been made of the U.S. forces travelling about the country.³³

Much of the intelligence in Bosnia was derived from the debriefing of U.S. personnel who participated in patrols or visited various Bosnian installations. Intelligence collection in Bosnia was more akin to police detective work than classic intelligence collection. Task Force Eagle (TFE) relied mainly on overt indicators observed through routine aggressive patrolling and tactical CI/HUMINT teams. This was not adequate for predictive or actionable intelligence. Information was not specific or timely enough to allow preemption of most hostile acts.

When TFE had a clear picture of the situation and commanders had identified specific threats and problems, they could take appropriate actions and

communicate that picture to higher level decisionmakers. The bulk of the information that contributed to this ability was human source information. In addition to patrols and tactical CI/HUMINT teams, TFE gathered and fed into the assessment process information from anyone who had regular contact with the population, the factions, and their leaders.³⁴

CI/HUMINT was the key to identifying the complex criminal and political organizations in Haiti. Conventional forces tied in with Special Forces elements operating in the countryside provided a "feel" for what was going on outside the city, and whether a major insurgent threat existed.³⁵ During the planning process little effort seems to have been devoted to collecting information from U.S. and foreign persons who were already conversant with the local political-military environment.

During Operation Restore Hope HUMINT proved to be the most valuable source of information in satisfying intelligence requirements.³⁶ The Marines established low-level source operations using tactical CI/HUMINT teams shortly after arrival in country and these formed the backbone of the HUMINT effort. These teams "saturated the areas at the grass roots level." Foot, motorized and mechanized patrols, debriefs of pilots, debriefs of drivers and commanders in truck convoys and meetings with members of NGOs augmented tactical CI/HUMINT team operations. National capabilities did not provide very detailed or accurate HUMINT of relevance to the tactical commander, because of focus, access, or both. One area that was not exploited was the potential intelligence collection capabilities of the Special Forces. The Special Forces that were

travelling in and out of Somalia from August onward should have been tasked to help develop IPB for Somalia. As it was, the potential intelligence collection capabilities were "not fully exploited during the period to D-Day" and a "lack of HUMINT, especially during deployment planning, plagued the IPB process, hindering the development of a thorough IPB for deploying forces."³⁷

The various NGOs operating in Somalia, were a potential source of information on the capabilities and likely intentions of the various Somali clans and subclans that could have been exploited. While NGOs are often reluctant to provide information to the military, none of the NGOs remaining in Somalia were "in any way" used as a source of information prior to the intervention.³⁸

The use of HUMINT during Operation Just Cause is an example of a less than successful effort. Military commanders complained about the poor quality of HUMINT during Operation Just Cause. Just Cause benefited from ideal circumstances, in which the United States' long association with Panama and unprecedented access to the country translated into the best possible HUMINT. Though HUMINT in JUST CAUSE was unsatisfactory later operations were sometimes worse. In Somalia, the ability of various agencies to collect HUMINT was severely circumscribed by language, Americans' unfamiliarity with Somali culture and society coupled with less time to collect intelligence prior to the deployment of troops, and less access to the country as a whole resulted in extremely poor HUMINT support.

While human sources are likely to provide the bulk of the information needed, IMINT and SIGINT can also provide valuable intelligence even in

OOTW. Army intelligence officers regretted not including SIGINT assets in the initial deployments to Somalia: those planning the deployment packages erroneously had assumed that SIGINT would not be of value in the low-technology Somali environment. Somalia is a country without a telephone system, so radio is frequently used for communication.³⁹

During Operation Uphold Democracy both Imagery and SIGINT proved invaluable. SIGINT provided many critical pieces of information. IMINT also played a key role. Every time an operation was planned or a weapons cache site was searched, intelligence personnel were able to provide detailed photographs of the neighborhood, the street it was on, and what the house looked like from side and overhead views.⁴⁰

Intelligence collection should not be left to intelligence professionals alone. Commanders should also give increased attention to preparing all intervention force personnel for intelligence collection. The dictum "intelligence collection is every soldier's responsibility" particularly applies to the U.S. forces involved in lesser conflicts. Experience shows that a great deal of potential HUMINT is lost, either because soldiers are not alerted sufficiently to the full scope of the information they should be attempting to collect during the course of their daily activities, or because soldiers are not trained sufficiently to conduct the tactical questioning of potential sources.

Use of Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, and Military Police in conjunction with counterintelligence agents has proved to be highly beneficial. In Operation Joint Endeavor the close coordination between psychological

operations (PSYOPs) and civil affairs (CA) increased the commander's ability to collect HUMINT because these assets spent a great deal of their time working in the surrounding villages. By continually meeting with CA and PSYOP personnel valuable information can be gathered without dedicating CI/HUMINT teams to the area. In some cases, Brigade and Battalion S-2s debriefed Tactical PSYOP Teams after missions and used the information collected in performing analysis of the area of responsibility (AOR). On at least one occasion, a battalion commander gave specific guidance directly to his supporting PSYOP asset to determine moods and opinions of the local civilians either before or after key IFOR activities. When it was determined that IFOR soldiers would start closing down illegal checkpoints, one battalion commander told his Tactical PSYOPs Team (TPT) to go out and "get a feel" for the attitudes of the civilians in reference to IFOR enforcement of freedom of movement in and out of the zone of separation (ZOS).⁴¹

The CA and PSOPS teams added benefit during Joint Endeavor was the level of people they came into contact with. The teams were talking with the normal towns people, not political figures who had their own message or interests addressed. This gave the commanders another viewpoint as to how the mission was perceived, and what effect the changing environment was having on the population.

Rather than having the CA and PSOPS teams submit the standard SALUTE reports, the teams were debriefed by CI personnel to ensure all the necessary information was gathered. The SALUTE report did not cover all the

possible information requirements needed, whereas the CI teams could identify valuable information that was seemingly useless information from the observers point of view. In fact, it was a goal of the command in Joint Endeavor to have any element that had contact with the outside population to be debriefed by a CI team.

The most difficult person to debrief, and one with valuable information, was the commander. With daily meetings and familiarity with the surroundings, his input can be invaluable to the intelligence picture. The problem during Operation Joint Endeavor was having the commander take time out of his schedule to conduct the debrief.

During Operation Restore Hope Counterintelligence (CI) and civil affairs (CA) teams combined to improve their intelligence collection potential. CA teams interacted with the Somali people, the NGOs, and other volunteer organizations that were working the humanitarian assistance mission. The CI teams conducted several collection activities in Somalia. They conducted low-level source operations, which included recruiting Somalis to observe and report suspicious activity. The CI teams talked to Somalis and NGO personnel to obtain information from them. They debriefed Somalis, NGO personnel and United Nations operations in Somalia (UNOSOM) II staffers. The CI teams also screened and interviewed Somali refugees. They analyzed the threat information to determine trends and patterns of enemy activity. Using the CA and CI teams in concert allowed them to complement each other.⁴²

In order to improve the collection of non-intelligence personnel, patrol and area checklists were developed during both Operations Restore Hope and Joint Endeavor. During Operation Restore Hope the use of the standard SALUTE report was not sufficient as the standard procedure for reporting intelligence information. The SALUTE report was not suitable for much of the information being reported. Information, like the demographics of Somali clans, the availability of food and water, and the presence of criminal elements, was hard to report using a format that was designed for conventional warfare. The Intelligence personnel in the ARFOR, at the S-2 levels and the G-2 levels, determined that a series of standardized checklists should be developed that provide a better means of reporting the information gathered by tactical units.

The following is an example of a roadblock checklist used by the 10th Mountain Division:

1. Report number and type of vehicles stopped. Report identifying markings and license plate numbers.
2. Report number of passengers on the vehicle. Report age and sex of passengers.
3. Report type and quantity of cargo.
4. Report stated points of origin and destination of vehicle.
5. Report stated reason for travel by passengers.
6. Report any weapons found on vehicles.
7. Report sightings by passengers of weapons, technicals, or bandits during their travel.

8. Report condition of passengers (general health, dress, attitudes).

9. Report anything unusual reported by passengers.

The information requested in these checklists was quite extensive. The use of these checklists by all units improved the accuracy and timeliness of intelligence information.⁴³

¹U.S. Army, FM 34-7, *Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Support to Low-Intensity Conflict Operations*, (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, June 1993), 1-3.

²*Ibid.*, 7-2.

³*Ibid.*, L-2.

⁴*Ibid.*, L-3.

⁵*Ibid.*, L-3.

⁶*Ibid.*, 1-3.

⁷U.S. Army, FM 34-130, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, July 1994), 6-16.

⁸*Ibid.*, 6-3.

⁹Jeffery N. Rapp, "Intelligence Requirements for Military Operations Other Than War: A Low Technology Business, Now and In the Future" (Strategic Research Project, U.S. Army War College, 1998), 1.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, 22.

¹¹*Ibid.*, 14.

¹²*Ibid.*, 30.

¹³Stephen T. Hosmer, "Information-Related Operations in Smaller-Scale Contingencies" (Washington, DC: RAND Corp., 1998), 13.

¹⁴Louis A. Traverzo, "Force Protection in Peace Operations" (Strategic Research Project, U.S. Army War College, 1997), 3.

¹⁵Cynthia L. Hayden, "Oral History Interviews, Operation Uphold Democracy" (Training Support Center, XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, NC 1995), 82.

¹⁶Rapp, 20.

¹⁷Denver E. McPherson, "Intelligence and the Peacekeeper in Haiti", *Military Intelligence Magazine*, April-June 1996, 45.

¹⁸Martin I. Urquhart, "The Effectiveness of Human Intelligence in Operation Uphold Democracy" (Masters of Military Art and Science Thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, 1996), 65.

¹⁹David A. Rababy, "Intelligence Support During a Humanitarian Mission" *Marine Corps Gazette*, February 1995, 40-42.

²⁰Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Operation Just Cause, Lessons Learned*, vol. 3 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combined Arms Command), 34.

²¹Jennifer Morrison Taw, "Operation Just Cause, Lessons for Operations Other Than War" (RAND Corp., Washington, DC, 1991), 18.

²²Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Operation Restore Hope* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combined Arms Command, September 98), 13.

²³Melissa A. Applegate, "Military Power in Operations Other Than War" (Master of Military Art and Science Thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, 1994), 115.

²⁴David A. Rababy, "Intelligence Support During a Humanitarian Mission" *Marine Corps Gazette* (February 1995), 40-42.

²⁵John, T. Fishel, "The Fog of Peace: Planning and Executing the Restoration of Panama" (Strategic Research Project, U.S. Army War College, April 1992), 37.

²⁶Taw, 18.

²⁷Written After Action Report, US Army Forces, Operation Uphold Democracy, (Headquarters 10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum, NY, 1996), 34.

²⁸Rapp, 10.

²⁹*Ibid.*, 19.

³⁰Fishel, 55.

³¹FM 34-7, 2-3.

³²Hosmer, 30.

³³Ibid, 38.

³⁴Rapp, 19.

³⁵Hayden, 73.

³⁶Kenneth Allard, "Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned" (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1995), 74.

³⁷Hosmer, 28.

³⁸Ibid., 29.

³⁹Ibid., 45.

⁴⁰Hayden, 93.

⁴¹Center for Army Lessons Learned, Bosnia-Herzegovina CAAT 02/30. (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combined Arms Command, September 1996), 30.

⁴²James M. Stuteville, "Tactical Intelligence Support in Somalia: Lessons Learned" (Masters of Military Art and Science Thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, 1996), 47.

⁴³Ibid., 48-49.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Having looked at the Intelligence requirements for the four operations, Just Cause, Restore Hope, Uphold Democracy, and Joint Endeavor, the researcher identified gaps between the requirements for these operations, and that which is stated in doctrine. In addition, the researcher identified collection methods used to satisfy these requirements. This study concludes with recommendations on Intelligence requirements for OOTW Operations.

The purpose of the historical examples is only to illustrate the possibilities that existed at that time to identify the appropriate Intelligence requirements. Both negative and positive examples were drawn from the case studies in order to illustrate the findings.

The first Intelligence Requirement is developing a thorough and current cultural background on the target country. The commander on the ground must have a good understanding of the culture he is working in, as well as the situation in the surrounding region. This includes the governmental leaders and political organizations and structures, military and paramilitary, economic situation, sociological background, demographics, history, criminal organizations and activity, and any non-governmental ruling elite (i.e., factions, families, tribes, etc.). All are key factors, some rise above others dependent upon the situation of the target country. This is an extremely challenging intelligence problem, but one that is absolutely necessary for success of the operations.

The majority of this information is obtained through open-source materials from governmental and international sources. Academia may also be a useful source. Universities and think tanks have individuals who have lived in the country, or spent considerable time studying the country.

The second Intelligence Requirement is to identify threats to U.S. forces as they conduct the mission. Force Protection was clearly the priority for all U.S. forces participating in initial stages of each operation. Their PIR illustrate this. In each case it was important to identify the threat, early and thoroughly, as this was a key driver in the force packages that were established in each of the operations. PIR included; who is the faction's leadership and how are they organized; what is their ideology, objectives, weapons and equipment, internal and external support, and tactics? Identifying the threat did not stop once forces were on the ground, it was a continuous process, and remained prominent during the duration of each of the operations.

The critical factor with the threat is that it will be most likely asymmetric. The threats or potential threats will not take U.S. forces on directly, weapon system on weapon system. They will look at a weakness, exploit it, and hope to get the desired reaction from U.S. forces. Normally when this happens the victim of the asymmetric attack suffers casualties, during OOTW operations this may put the operation at risk. Leaders and intelligence professionals must be diligent in their examination of the operation to decrease the probability of an asymmetric attack happening.

Asymmetric foes seek offsets against our stronger, more technologically advanced capabilities by indirectly attacking things that are both strengths and weaknesses, e.g., the openness of our culture. They will attack to upset our capabilities to synchronize things we are doing. They will operate in both physical and moral domains of war, using terror to affect aggregate psyches of the American populace.

The third Intelligence Requirement was identifying the nature of the operating environment. This went beyond weather and terrain data, but also included the infrastructure U.S. forces would be operating in. Questions included; what is the road network, airport facilities, and status of public utilities to include water, sewer, electricity, and telephone network? Identify weather patterns, seasonal information, and threats from potential natural disasters.

The fourth Intelligence Requirement was identifying the potential for internal violence, and how it might affect U.S. forces. This goes along with identifying who the main factions, parties, or clans are and the attitudes towards each other. What are the alliances? What factions and individuals have something to gain by the destruction of others? Does one segment feel they were unjustly persecuted by others prior to U.S. forces being involved. Internal violence must be addressed in the Rules of Engagement.

The fifth Intelligence Requirement was to identify the number and type of weapons available to the nonmilitary population. In each of the operations U.S. forces implemented some type of weapons buy-back program. In one case identifying and seizing illegal weapons became the centerpiece of the operation.

Knowing a start point for existing weapons and who controls them is critical for this type of program to succeed.

The final Intelligence Requirement, and one that is possibly the most important to the success of U.S. forces in the operation, is perception of the mission on the part of the native population. In future operations, commanders will want to gear their intelligence and other information collection systems, including the front-line soldier, to collect on those indicators signaling the direction in which the perception of the operation is heading.

Success in OOTW missions is about perception management. U.S. forces have to know and understand their perceptions and that of their opponents'. Perception is a critical aspect. While U.S. forces' perception remains very important in this equation, probably the most important aspect lies in the opponent's perception. Opponents perception of U.S. forces, their perception of themselves, their perception of their environment, their perception of U.S. forces' perception, the nature of conflict, life and death, success and so forth. This is a complicated interaction, but it lies at the heart of successful operations. To engage successfully in this dynamic, U.S. forces must avoid, at all costs, mirror imaging, where western values are imposed on the enemy. U.S. forces can do this through collaboration with country experts, and through the use of pertinent ethnic people in the wargaming process.

Two final areas that must be discussed are the mind-set leaders and intelligence professionals must have when undertaking OOTW missions. The first area is how they view the operation. As brought out earlier in the paper the

majority of OOTW missions occur in urban areas with no clearly defined threat. There will be no situation template with various courses of action the threat may execute. Rather, it is more detective work, trying to piece the puzzle together, than confirming or denying courses of action. A good example would be tracking stolen humanitarian aid foodstuffs. In addition to manning checkpoints and escorting convoys, why not place tracking devices within the foodstuff to see where and who is taking the materials. An unconventional approach but a good tool that may help a commander accomplish the mission.

The second relates to the assets available to the commander within his staff that can help him in answering his intelligence requirements. The combination of the HUMINT assets gathering intelligence, the Civil Affairs officer conducting direct liaison with the local populace and many NGOs through the Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC), the psychological operations officer trying to win the hearts and minds of the populace, the public affairs officer ensuring the correct command message is being transmitted and received, all can be critical information gathering tools if properly coordinated. The key is the coordination function within the unit staff. The person most capable, is the S3, Operation Officer. Regular meetings must be conducted, information exchanged, and official tasking produced that will ensure that all potential assets are at work, helping answer the commander's information requirements.

Further Study

The author identified two areas during the research that deserve further study. The first is what is the responsibility for U.S. forces involved in multinational to provide intelligence support to coalition forces. Research conducted identified the intelligence requirements for U.S. forces and various collection methods. The Army needs to determine what information can be shared with coalition partners, and what access can be given.

The second area of study concerns the success of passing on lessons learned from previously conducted OOTW operations to future operations. Research conducted to examine the lessons learned from Panama, Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, and Bosnia to see if they are passed-on lessons would be very valuable. The Army and specifically the intelligence community need to know if lessons learned are being passed down, or if the same mistakes are made at beginning of each OOTW operation.

Summary

This study examined the Intelligence requirements for four operations, Operation Just Cause, Operation Restore Hope, Operation Uphold Democracy, Operation Joint Endeavor. Using the doctrinal principles for intelligence requirements for OOTW operations, this paper determined commonality between the operations for intelligence requirements, and if these requirements are reflected in current doctrine. These operations were vastly different and took place in various parts of the world, thus certain intelligence requirements were

more critical in one operation than another. Identification of common intelligence requirements for OOTW assists the military intelligence professional to transfer from a Cold War, conventional force mentality, to the ambiguous world of OOTW operations.

The U.S. Army experienced both success and failure during each of the examined operations. This observation is not an indictment of the professionals involved in these operations. Units involved in the operations learned crucial lessons, and previously unidentified critical intelligence requirements and collection techniques were developed to best support the commander. U.S. soldiers and their leaders are extremely imaginative and can adapt to almost any situation, and the U.S. Army needs to take advantage of this ingenuity. If the past is any indication of the future, the U.S. Army will be involved in operations similar to the ones examined in this paper. The important thing is that these lessons and techniques are not lost while preparing for future operations. The author hopes this work will contribute to the future success of units selected to deploy on new and unique OOTW deployments.

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